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CHANGING CONCEPTS AND CY PRES
EDITH L. FISCHf
The constant and ever increasing efforts of courts and legislatures over
the past decade to sustain and support charitable gifts has propelled the
law of charities well along the path towards establishment of a principle
that property once given to charity is forever dedicated to charity.
The changing attitude of the American judiciary and legislatures in
regard to charitable dispositions has run the gamut from early rejection
to complete acceptance and liberal support,' and as pertains to the cy
pres doctrine in particular, has ranged from strict enforcement of its
prerequisites to the present tendency towards liquefication.
Until 1900 the common law emphasis on individual rights and private
property led to a judicial reluctance to deviate from the original plans of
the donor. Where the choice was between a variance and failure of the
gift the latter alternative was adopted. The wishes of the donor were
superior to the necessities of changing conditions and the interests of
society as a whole.2
After 1900 the common law stress on individualism, which constituted
a revolt against the spirit of the Middle Ages,3 began to lessen and the
tide of thinking flowed towards society as a whole.4 The concept of the
public good resulted in judicial recognition of a duty to secure to society
the benefits of gifts contributed for charitable purposes and to a realiza-
tion that the public is the real and ultimate beneficiary of charitable
activities.' With increasing ease the courts were able to establish the
presence of the necessary prerequisites to the cy pres doctrine and to
accord careful attention to the needs and interests of the community in
making new applications of charitable funds."
Since the middle of the 1940's the desire to support and uphold char-
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 394, for biographical data.
I Fisch, "American Acceptance of Charitable Trusts," 28 Notre Dame Law. 219 (1953).
2 See, e.g., White v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 30 (1852); Merrill v. Hayden, 86 Me. 133, 29 At.
949 (1893); Harvard College v. Society for Promoting Theological Educ., 3 Gray 280
(Mass. 1855).
3 Pound, "The Spirit of the Common Law," 18 The Green Bag 17, 24 (1906).
4 Fisch, "The Cy Pres Doctrine in the U.S." 115-27 (1950).
5 See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank of Texarkana v. Bann, 202 Ark. 850, 153 S.W.2d 158 (1941);
McCarroll v. Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F., 154 Ark. 376, 243 S.W. 870 (1922); Thatcher v.
Lewis, 335 Mo. 1130, 76 S.W.2d 677 (1934); City of Keene v. Eastman, 75 N.H. 191, 72
Adt. 213 (1909); Matter of MacDowell, 217 N.Y. 454, 112 N.E. 177 (1916), reversing, 170
App. Div. 245, 156 N.Y. Supp. 387 (2d Dep't 1915), which affirmed, 89 Misc. 323, 153
N.Y. Supp. 653 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1915).
6 In re Butin's Estate, 81 Cal. App. 2d 76, 183 P.2d 304 (1947); Ford v. Rockland
Trust Co., 331 Mass. 25, 116 N.E.2d 669 (1954); In re Neher's Will, 279 N.Y. 370, 18
N.E.2d 625 (1939), reversing, 254 App. Div. 708, 4 N.Y.S.2d 983 (2d Dep't 1938); In re
Dean's Estate, 167 Misc. 238, 3 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1938) ; Estate of
McKee, 378 Pa. 607, 108 A.2d 214 (1954).
itable dispositions whenever possible has gained momentum and has now
outstripped the narrow confines of the cy pres doctrine as traditionally
applied. This has led to two important developments. One of these is the
crumbling of the walls of the cy pres doctrine and its remodelling to
conform to the pressures of a society intent on preserving charitable dis-
positions of property7 The other is the judicial utilization of more
flexible doctrines and trust devices in areas formerly reserved exclusively
for cy pres.8
It is the purpose of this article to examine these developments.
THE REmODELLING OF CY PRES
Elimination of Prerequisites
As traditionally applied, the exercise of the cy pres doctrine is subject
to three prerequisites-a charitable trust, a general charitable intent,
and the impossibility, impracticality or illegality of carrying out the
terms of the particular purpose specified In the past the courts have
meticulously sought to satisfy each of these prerequisites before apply-
ing the doctrine. Moreover all of these common law prerequisites were
judicially read into cy pres legislation when the statute embodied one or
more of these requirements but fell short of complete inclusion.' °
Since the beginning of the twentieth century the rigors of these pre-
requisites have been slowly melted down by judicial construction. Gifts
given in outright terms to a charitable donee have been held "subject to
a trust" or a trust has been implied," a general charitable intent almost
invariably uncovered,1" and impossibility or impracticality found with
increasing ease. 13  Not until 1947, however, had any state expressly
eliminated any of these prerequisites. In that year Pennsylvania, by a
statute which expressly dispensed with the requirement of a general
charitable intent, became the first state to do so.'4 Six years later New
7 See notes 9-34 infra.
8 See notes 35-37 infra.
9 Fisch, op. cit. supra note 4, at 128.
10 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §§ 108-202 (1958), Goree v. Georgia Industrial Home, 187
Ga. 368, 200 S.E. 684 (1938) (general charitable intent); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 12(2)
(1958); Matter of Rappolt, 140 Misc. 239, 250 N.Y. Supp. 377 (Surr. Ct. Bronx County
1931) (trust); R.I. Gen. Laws § 18-4-1 (1957); Powers v. Home for Aged Women, 58
R.I. 323, 192 At. 770 (1937) (general charitable intent).
11 In re Peterson's Estate, 202 Minn. 31, 277 N.W. 529 (1938); Matter of Syracuse
University (Hendricks), 1 Misc. 2d 904, 148 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1955), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 890, 161 N.Y.S.2d 855 (4th Dep't 1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 744,
148 N.E.2d 911 (1958) (where gift was given as an "endowment" a trust was implied);
In re Walter's Estate, 150 Misc. 512, 269 N.Y. Supp. 400 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1933).
12 Fisch, op. cit. supra note 4, at 162.
18 Id. at 143-47.
14 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 301.10 (1957) (cy pres applicable whether the intention of
the conveyor be "general or specific").
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York expressly eliminated the trust requirement from its cy pres legis-
lation.15
The trend towards express elimination of the prerequisites through
legislation has been accompanied by a refusal to read these requirements
into statutes which do not expressly include them. McDonough County
Orphanage v. Burnhart,16 decided in 1955 is typical of this tendency.
Here the court refused to read the common law prerequisite of a general
charitable intent into section 55 of the Illinois General Not for Profit
Corporation Act which requires the transference of the assets of a dis-
solved corporation to "one or more domestic or foreign corporations,
societies or organizations engaged in activities" substantially similar to
those of a dissolving corporationY In transferring the funds of a dis-
solved orphanage to the Salvation Army to be used for the care of
dependent children, the court disposed of the claim by the heirs of the
donor to a reversion in the fund based on an alleged absence of a general
charitable intent by finding that this element was not determinative of
the cause. Indeed the court went so far as to expressly assume (without
so deciding) that there was no general charitable intent and that the
property could not be applied to similar charitable purposes under the
cy pres doctrine.' 8 The argument that the prerequisites of the cy pres
principle must be read into the legislation was rejected on the ground
that the "standard established is statutory and is not hampered by any
limitations imposed on the applicability of the cy pres doctrine."'' 9
Changing Standards of Impossibility
Under the cy pres doctrine as traditionally applied, the question of
whether it has become impossible to carry out the charitable gift has
been tested by reference to the particular objective of the donor as
expressed in the dispositive instrument; any obstacle to the effectuation
of the details of the charitable scheme or plan was deemed sufficient to
satisfy this cy pres prerequisite. The trend today, however, is to use an
implied general charitable intent rather than the specific plan expressed
by the donor as the standard of impossibility, so that if, for example, a
donor gives property to a stated school the impossibility of carrying out
15 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 12(2-a) (1958); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § i13(2-a) (1958)
(1 . . . the jurisdiction of the court to prevent failure of such a gift, grant or devise
and give effect to the general purpose thereof is not defeated by the fact that the donee,
grantee or devisee does not exist or lacks capacity to take at the time the gift, grant or
devise would otherwise become effective, whether or not the gift, grant or devise creates
an express trust for such purpose").
16 5 Ill. 2d 230 125 NX..2d 625 (1955).
17 IlM. Stat. Ann. c.32 §§ 163a53-54 (1958).
18 McDonough County Orphanage v. Burnhart, supra note 16, at 239, 125 N.E.2d at 631.
19 Id. at 247, 125 N.E.2d at 635.
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this gift is not determined by referring to the particular details of his
gift but by ascertaining whether the gift can be used for education.
Similarly, if a gift is given to a particular hospital the court will. de-
termine not whether the gift to the particular hospital can be carried out
but whether it can be used at all to benefit the sick. These courts thus
assume without discussion the existence of one of the most controversial
questions in the law of cy pres, namely whether the donor had a specific or
general intent. In so doing the courts appear to have created a sub-
stantive rule to the effect that every donor who dedicates property to a
specific charitable purpose, institution or organization possesses in addi-
tion a broader charitable intent.
This type of reasoning renders negligible the possibility of a finding
of impossibility or impracticality. And since the question of cy pres
never arises unless the directions of the donor cannot be effectuated, a
holding that it is possible to carry out the purposes of the gift obviates
at the very outset the necessity for resort to cy pres. The risk of a
reversion of the fund to the heirs in the event that all of the cy pres pre-
requisites cannot be found is thereby eliminated.
This modem theory has been utilized when the expressed trust purpose
was assumed by another charity after the designated charitable donee
ceased to exist. In Zevely v. City of Paris,20 the settlor directed that the,
income from a trust be used to establish and maintain a room in the
W. W. Massie Memorial Hospital in memory of her son to be "a free
room for the use of deserving young men as far as practicable." It was
further provided that in the event that the W. W. Massie Hospital should
permanently cease to be used as a hospital the trust fund should be
returned to the settlor or her heirs. Years later the W. W. Massie Hos-
pital was sold, the court ordering the proceeds to be applied to the con-
struction of a nurses' home at the site of a newly built hospital. One of
the heirs of the donor brought suit to recover the trust corpus on the
ground that it reverted when the building ceased to be used as a hospital.
This argument was rejected by the lower court which had invoked the
cy pres doctrine to allow the funds to be used by the new hospital for a
free room which it had established as a memorial to the donor's son. The
appellate court, while it sustained this application of the funds, found
no need to invoke the cy pres doctrine since the donor's
paramount purpose was not to benefit the hospital but to benefit needy
young men and provide a memorial for her son. Obviously, since the pur-
pose of the trust is being carried out, cy pres need not be invoked.21 (Em-
phasis added.)
20 298 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. 1957).
21 Cf. dissent 298 S.W.2d at 14.
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This rationale has also been adopted when some change has been made
in the control, ownership or method of operation of the charity, but the
change has not destroyed its charitable character. Matter of Ablett2 is
typical of these cases. Here a gift, to take effect after the termination
of a life estate, was made to "London Hospital at Whitechapel" in Eng-
land, the income to be used for such purposes as the board of directors
deemed advisable. Although the hospital had been nationalized the
Court of Appeals of New York refused to find impossibility. The court's
theory was that "literal compliance" with the terms of the will was
practicable since "(t)he poor whom testatrix intended to benefit were
not legislated out of existence by the National Health Service Act.' 23
The appellate division had come to the same conclusion, finding that:
Notwithstanding the marked administrative and fiscal changes effected by
the Act, the work of the healing and caring for the sick at the London
Hospital goes on as before, and viewing the problem simply as a question
of the intention of the testatrix, we would not be justified in saying that
the donee for whom she intended the gift has ceased to exist .... She de-
sired her money to cure the sick who came to that particular hospital for
treatment, and in so doing to perpetuate the memory of her late husband.
Both of those purposes will still be promoted by her legacy.24
That the desire to avoid the pitfalls of cy pres and thus insure the
continued use of the gift for charitable purposes dictates the holding in
any given case as to the presence or absence of impossibility is clearly
revealed by a comparison of In re Bishop's Estate5 and Pennsylvania
Company for Banking and Trusts v. Board of Governors of London Hos-
22 206 Misc. 157, 132 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Surr. Ct. Oneida County 1954), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d
205, 153 N.Y.S.2d 816 (4th Dep't 1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 261, 144 N.E.2d 46 (1957). In
First Nat'l Bank v. King Edward's Hospital Fund, 1 Ill. App. 2d 338, 117 N.E.2d 656
(1954), which also involved gifts to nationalized English hospitals, an Illinois court found
that the hospitals were still functioning as hospitals and the application of the gifts to the
nationalized hospitals was not an application to a different charitable use but to the same
charitable use. The lower court had awarded the funds to the nationalized hospitals upon
the basis of cy pres. The appellate court, however, stated that "(w)e are of the opinion
that the relief afforded in the instant case could have been obtained by the exercise of the
court's inherent equity powers." It went on to add that "(o)nly management and owner-
ship of the hospitals . . . have changed by reason of the Act. The award of these funds
to these hospitals under the present management and ownership is not just an application
of these funds to institutions of a similar charitable purpose, but to the identical purpose
contemplated by the testator."
23 Matter of Ablett, 3 N.Y.2d at 278, 144 N.E.2d at 54.
24 Matter of Ablett, 2 App. Div. 2d at 209-10, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
25 206 Misc. 7, 129 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1954), aff'd, 1 App. Div. 2d
612, 152 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st Dep't 1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 294, 144 N.E.2d 63 (1957).
The court reached a similar holding in Matter of Perkins, 1 Misc. 2d 589, 145 N.Y.S.2d
775 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1955), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 655, 152 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1st Dep't
1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 281, 144 N.E.2d 56, 165 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1957) which also involved
outright gifts to nationalized English hospitals. Since there was no gift over to other
charities it was only by finding that it had not become impossible to carry out the gift
and thereby cutting off invocation of the cy pres doctrine that the risk of a reversion was
avoided.
CY PRES
Pital.2 In re Bishop's Estate,' involved a gift by a testatrix, who died
in 1938, of one-half of her residuary estate, after the termination of a
life estate, "to the Dunfermline & West Fife Hospital" in Scotland to
have and to hold the same forever. As a result of the National Hospital
Service Act enacted in 1948, the ownership of the hospital was transferred
from the trustees to the Secretary of State for Scotland and its admin-
istration and control placed under the West Fife Hospital Board of
Management, a public corporate body. In 1950 the life tenant died.
Against the contention of the Attorney General that the nationalization
of the hospital had brought about a fundamental change in its character
and a resulting loss of the entity for which the testatrix intended the
bequest and that the cy pres doctrine was thus applicable, the court held
that the hospital had in no sense lost its former identity and that there
was therefore no reason for exercising the cy pres principle. That the
limitations of cy pres might have led to the return of the property to
private individuals was made explicit by the court when it stated that
"(w)ere that not the case [that the cy pres doctrine is inapplicable] it is
quite possible that a contrary result would be required because of the
holding in Wright v. Wright.""
The Wright case29 held that an absolute gift, as distinguished from a
gift in trust, lapses if a corporate donee loses its corporate existence
before the time fixed for the bequest to take effect. Since the hospital
was nationalized in 1948, before the termination of the life estate, and
the gift to the hospital was in outright terms it is likely that were this
case deemed to be within the purview of the cy pres doctrine the gift
would have to be disposed of as intestate property.
In Pennsylvania Company for Banking and Trusts v. Board of Gov-
ernors of London Hospital,"0 a Rhode Island court reached a contrary
conclusion by finding that the National Health Service Act brought about
failure of the gift, the original governing board no longer holding title
to the property. This holding, however, did not result in a reversion to
the heirs of the donor because here there was a gift over to other charities
in the event of failure of the primary gift. 1 That the court was aware
that despite its conclusions as to the effect of nationalization the enforce-
ment of the gift over would preserve the gift for charity was made clear
26 79 R.I. 74, 83 A.2d 881 (1951).
27 See note 25 supra.
28 206 Misc. 2d at 1s, 129 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
29 225 N.Y. 329, 122 N.E. 213 (1919).
30 Note 26 supra.
31 The court found that the presence of an alternative disposition removed the case
from the scope of the cy pres doctrine. See cases cited notes 42-48 infra.
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when it pointed out that "in the present instance there is other specific
disposition and the alternate beneficiaries are also charities."'
Thus the conclusion of any particular court on the issue of impos-
sibility is likely to be determined by whether it will save or destroy the
continued charitable use of the property.
The testing of impossibility in terms of an assumed underlying broad
charitable intent rather than by reference to the specific purpose stated
by the donor blocks the application of the cy pres doctrine. It also fur-
nishes an apparent justification for departure from the particular char-
itable purpose absent its impossibility or impracticality. This is illustrated
by Cleveland Museum of Art v. O'Neill,3 which involved a declaratory
judgment action requesting an interpretation of the provisions of three
trust funds which had been established to acquire art objects for the
Cleveland Museum. At the time of suit the museum was engaged in
constructing additional physical facilities and requested that the doctrine
of deviation be exercised so as to permit the income from these three
trust funds to be applied for a limited time towards the construction
work. Even though the court found that there was no present failure of
the specific purposes of these trusts it permitted the income to be used
for building purposes since the long range trust purpose, namely to main-
tain an outstanding museum of art would be ultimately defeated unless
the income were used for building. The court theorized that "lack of
space now means loss of pictures for public enjoyment" and that the
institution could not "continue to render full service to a growing city
if it is cramped to such an extent that it is unable to display masterpieces
it now possesses and art it will acquire in future years.134
The significance of this decision rests not only in the practical elimina-
tion of a requirement of impossibility or impracticality as a condition for
variance of the donor's original plans but in the refusal to accord force
to the express words of the donor. To that extent it may foreshadow an
era when gifts once given to charity will not only be forever devoted to
charity but may be applied by the charitable donee (with or without
court approval) in whatever manner is best suited to the carrying out
of its functions, free from and unrestricted by the explicit purpose
expressed in the donative instrument.
32 Pennsylvania Co. for Banking and Trusts v. Board of Governors of London Hospital,
supra note 26, at 87-88, 83 A.2d at 888.
33 129 N.E.2d 669 (Ohio 1955).
34 Id. at 671. Cf. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 121
A.2d 296 (Del. 1956) (a trust for the needy poor may not be used for library purposes);
St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E.2d 305 (1939) (a bequest to be
held as an endowment for "the ordinary expenses of maintenance" can not be used in
partial payment of a mortgage debt on real property).
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UTILIZATIONI OF OTHER DEvIcEs
Doctrine of Deviation
In recent years the courts have made increasing use of the doctrine of
deviation.to achieve objectives usually reached by exercise of the cy pres
principle. The doctrine of deviation is analogous to, but not as extensive
as, cy pres. It allows a court of equity, under its general power to ad-
minister trusts, to authorize a deviation from the terms of the trust in
matters pertaining to its administration as distinguished from its purpose.
Unlike the cy pres doctrine, the court need not find a general charitable
intent as a prerequisite to its application.35
First National Bank of Akron v. Unknown Heirs of Donnelly,3" dem-
onstrates the advantages implicit in the doctrine of deviation. This
declaratory judgment action concerned a gift by a testator to "a Catholic
Orphanage located in Summit County, Ohio," or for the establishment of
a Catholic orphanage in that county "if there be none located" therein.
There was no Catholic orphanage in Summit County either at the time
of suit or when the will was executed, and the amount of the fund was
insufficient to establish an orphanage. Upon these facts the court ordered
the fund to be held by the trustee and administered by it under the con-
tinuing direction of the probate court for the care, maintenance and
support of Catholic orphans of Summit County cared for at Parmadale
(the diocesan orphanage in an adjoining county) or any other home or
institution of a similar character. It was further held that the remaining
fund be turned over to a Catholic orphanage in Summit County should
one ever be established. On appeal the question was whether the lower
court had disposed of the fund by the doctrine of deviation or by another
doctrine such as cy presYT In determining this issue the court made
explicit its preference for the doctrine of deviation over that of cy pres
by stating:
If the primary purpose of a charitable trust can be accomplished by de-
viation from express terms in the instrument of creation, in respect to
purely administrative matters, it becomes unnecessary to analyze the facts
in the light of the doctrine of cy pres, and in doing the latter, determine
whether the donor manifested a general charitable intent, and, if so,
whether the property should be used for an approximate charitable purpose
35 Craft v. Shroyer, 81 Ohio App. 253, 74 N.E.2d 589 (1947).
86 96 Ohio App. 509, 122 N.E.2d 672 (1954).
37 The decision does not make clear the manner in which this question arose. Most
likely it was created by the contention of the heirs that the lower court could not base its
holding upon the doctrine of deviation but only upon the doctrine of cy pres and since
there was no general charitable intent the cy pres doctrine could not be properly applied.
The holding therefore was erroneous.
1959] CY PRES
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
(a purpose as nearly as may be like the purpose stated by the donor)
when it is impossible to exactly carry out this specific intent.3 8
The decision of the lower court was affirmed on the ground that the
court had power "to permit deviation from the settlor's directions as to
mere methods of administration, where the charitable objective is not
changed but rather the means and method of accomplishing it are varied."
The court expressly declined to decide whether the doctrine of cy pres
could also have been applied.
A precedent for this holding had been established seven years pre-
viously by Craft v. Shroyer,39 a construction proceeding concerning prop-
erty that had been left for the purpose of establishing a home for orphans
of the United Lutheran Church in Miami County, Ohio. Alleging that it
had become impractical to carry out the specific terms of the trust the
petitioners asked the court to exercise the cy pres doctrine so as to apply
the funds to "the Oesterlen Home for children of the United Lutheran
Church in America located in Clark County, Ohio." The heirs admitted
the impracticality of carrying out the terms of the gift but argued that
the trust had failed because of the absence of a general charitable intent.
The court invoked the cy pres doctrine and awarded the funds to the
Oesterlen Home. On appeal the heirs claimed that the judgment was
contrary to law in that the court had failed to find that the testatrix had
a general charitable intent. In disposing of this argument the appellate
court found that the testatrix did not have a general charitable intent
but under the doctrine of deviation, which does not require such an
intent, ordered the funds expended for the support of orphans of the
United Lutheran Church of Miami County during their residence in the
Oesterlen Home or any other similar institution or private home. This
departure from the terms of the will was apparently deemed a mere
detail of administration and not a change of the purpose or object of the
trust nor a change in the class of beneficiaries or a diversion of the
funds from the designated charitable purpose.
Eflect of a Gift Over
Formerly the fact that the donor had provided for a gift over upon
the failure of the specified charitable purpose did not prevent the courts
from testing the primary bequest in terms of the cy pres doctrine and
applying that principle when a general charitable intent was found.40
38 First Nat'l Bank of Akron v. Unknown Heirs of Donnelly, supra note 36, at 514,
122 N.E.2d at 675.
39 81 Ohio App. 253, 74 N.E.2d 589 (1947).
40 Village of Hinsdale v. Chicago City Missionary Soc'y, 375 III. 220, 30 N.E.2d 657
(1940); In re Y.W.C.A. of N.Y.C., 96 N.J. Eq. 568, 126 Ati. 610 (1924).
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As expressed by one court, "a secondary purpose will not prevail where
the primary charitable objective of the donor can be attained by a dif-
ferent method. 4 1
Today, cy pres is rarely, if ever, considered in this situation, the theory
being that the expressed intent of the donor in regard to the alternative
beneficiary obviates the need for its use.42 This rationale has become
crystallized in the rule that the doctrine of cy pres is inapplicable when
the donor by a gift over declares how the funds should be used upon
failure.4 3 Moreover, this rule has been extended so as to allow its ap-
plication, with a consequent effectuation of the gift over upon failure of
the primary bequest, even though the specified event or contingency
upon which the gift over was to operate has not occurred.44
Thus in City of Belfast v. Goodwill Farms,45 property was left to the
City of Belfast for the purpose of maintaining a home for aged men but
if the city refused to accept the gift, then the property was to go to other
charities. The city did accept the gift but a year thereafter brought an
action to obtain a decree relieving it of the trust, chiefly on the ground
that the sum left to the trustees was insufficient to equip, support and
maintain the designated home. Although the absence of a general char-
itable intent precluded the exercise of cy pres in regard to the primary
gift, and although the express condition of the gift over (refusal by the
city) failed to occur the court struggled to sustain the gift for charity.
This was accomplished by invoking the principle that the cy pres doc-
trine is not applicable where there is a specific alternative gift effective
upon failure of the primary charitable gift. The court reasoned that
despite the wording used by the testator in making the gift over to other
41 Village of Hinsdale, supra note 40, at 234, 30 N.E.2d at 664.
42 In re Harrington's Estate, 151 Neb. 81, 36 N.W.2d 557 (1949); Pennsylvania Co. for
Banking and Trusts v. Board of Governors of London Hospital, 79 R.I. 74, 83 A.2d 881
(1951) (gifts to charity but in case any shall fail "(for any reasons now unimaginable by
me) my property shall surely go, in such event, to the work of establishing the knowledge
and following of Jesus Christ among our American people"). See also cases cited note 43
infra.
43 Camden Trust Co. v. Christ's Home of Warminster, Pa., 28 NJ. Super. 466, 101 A.2d
84 (1953) (the cy pres doctrine can not, of course, be applied where the testator has di-
rected what disposition shall be made of trust property in the event of failure of the use
to which he directed it should be put); In re Shapiro's Estate, 112 N.Y.s.2d 46 (Surr. CL
N.Y. County 1952); see In re Price's Will, 264 App. Div. 29, 35 N.Y.S.2d 111 (3d Dept.
1942), affirmed, 289 N.Y. 751, 46 N.E.2d 354 (1943).
44 See cases cited notes 45-50 infra. See also First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. American
Bd. of Comm'rs for Foreign Missions, 328 Ill. App. 481, 66 N.E.2d 446 (1946) (although
the will made no express provision for the event which occurred the court implied an in-
tention that where one of the legatees should cease to exist the remaining charitable
legatees should take). Compare the following cases in which the court applied the primary
gift cy pres upon its failure when there was an alternative disposition to take effect upon
a certain event which did not occur. Union Methodist Episcopal Church v. Equitable
Trust Co., 32 Del. Ch. 197, 83 A.2d 111 (1951); Souther v. Schofield, 95 N.H. 379, 63 A.2d
796 (1949) (doctrine of approximation applied).
45 150 Me. 17, 103 A.2d 517 (1954).
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charities he intended "to cover the possibility of a failure of the gift in
the uncertain future.""
Defenders of Furbearers v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Lex-
ington21 presented a similar situation. The testatrix left funds for a
humane society suggesting that they be "used to hire a competent agent
to work on streets of Lexington and try to relieve the condition of mis-
erable horses allowed to be overworked and mistreated." She further
provided that should the organization decline the bequest under her con-
ditions, that the money be divided equally between two other charities.
The humane society accepted the gift. However, a problem arose when
it was discovered that there were no "miserable" or "overworked and
mistreated" horses on the streets of Lexington. Since the word "suggest"
as used in the will was construed as an absolute condition rather than as
precatory, the lower court found that the gift to the humane society
failed. But because of the absence of a general charitable intent the
cy pres doctrine could not be applied. It was further held by the lower
court that the gift over could not be given effect because the society had
not "declined" the gift. On appeal, however, the gift over was given
effect on the ground that it is to be "considered as having been intended
to take effect upon an impossibility of performance the same as upon a
voluntary declination of the gift."4 The cy pres issue was thus removed
from the case.49
By utilizing these principles when there is a gift over on the failure of
the primary gift, the courts are able to cut off any controversy as to
whether the intent of the donor was general or specific and at the same
time save the gift for charity, provided, of course, that the alternative
beneficiaries are charities. °
Implied Trusts and Rules of Construction
At one time gifts to unincorporated charitable associations, unable to
take title to property under state laws,61 were upheld by applications of
the cy pres doctrine 2 When the prerequisites to the exercise of the doc-
46 Supra note 45, at 24, 103 A.2d at 521.
47 306 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1957).
48 Id. at 102.
49 Id. at 103.
60 Where the alternative beneficiary is a private individual or non-charitable organization
the courts will probably utilize other devices to save the gift for charity such as a finding
that it is not impossible to carry out the donor's primary gift. See notes 20-28 supra.
51 1 Powell, Real Property § 131 (1949).
52 In re Peterson's Estate, 202 Minn. 31, 277 N.W. 529 (1938); In re Walter's Estate, 172
Misc. 207, 15 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Surr. Ct. Nassau County 1939), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 1078, 21
N.Y.S.2d 37 (2d Dep't 1940), modified, 285 N.Y. 158, 33 N.E.2d 72 (1941); Prudential
Ins. Co. v. N.Y. Guild for Jewish Blind, 252 App. Div. 493, 299 N.Y. Supp. 917 (1st Dept.
1937).
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trine could not be established the gift failed.53 Today, such gifts are sus-
tained by implying a trust and appointing a trustee to hold the property
for the association on the rationale that equity will not let a trust fail for
want of a trustee. 4 New York courts have developed a so-called "rule
of construction" which allows a parent corporation to hold in trust prop-
erty given to its unincorporated branch or subsidiary to be used for the
purposes specified by the donor.5 Thus a gift to an unincorporated local
branch of the Salvation Army or to a Red Cross chapter is upheld by
awarding it to the incorporated parent to be used for the designated
chapter.
Statutes have also cared for this situation by providing that the un-
incorporated association may take the property if it incorporates within
a prescribed period-" or by providing that property devised or bequeathed
to an unincorporated entity be held or administered for the benefit of
such devisee or legatee by a corporation with which it is connected. 5
These statutes and judicial devices insure the use of the gift for charity
regardless of the existence of the cy pres prerequisites.
CONCLUSION
So long as courts will employ some theory, method or device, no matter
how strained or distorted, to sustain a gift made to charity, the continued
requirement of the cy pres prerequisites serves no useful end. Their
elimination, on the other hand, would not only render unnecessary the
present circumlocutions employed to take cases outside the orbit of cy
pres, but would facilitate the preservation of charitable gifts since the
only question in regard to a charitable scheme which can no longer be
carried out in accordance with the specified terms of the donor would
then be the proper exercise of the court's discretion in regard to a dif-
ferent mode of operation or choice of another charitable purpose.
53 Robinson v. Crutcher, 277 Mo. 1, 209 S.W. 104 (1919); In re Jones' Estate, 108
N.Y.S.2d 812 (Surr. Ct. Bronx County 1951); In-re Grossman's Estate, 190 Misc. 521, 75
N.Y.S.2d 335 (Surr. Ct. Bronx County 1947); In re Gault's Estate, 48 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Surr.
Ct. Bronx County 1944).
54 Craven v. Wilmington Teachers Ass'n, 47 A.2d 580 (Del. Ch. 1946) (teachers associa-
tion) ; Barnhart v. Bowers, 143 Kan. 866, 57 P.2d 60 (1936) (old order church) ; Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Board of Missions of Presbyterian Church, 226 N.C. 546, 39 S.E.2d
621 (1946) (Asheville Normal and Associated Schools); In re Thronson's Estate, 243 Wis.
73, 9 N.W.2d 641 (1943) (Masonic home).
L5 In re Pfizer's Estate, 33 N.J. Super. 242, 110 A.2d 40 (1954), aff'd, 17 N.J. 40, 110
A.2d 54 (1954) (New York law applied to gift to Bellevue and Governeur's Hospitals);
In re Welton's Will, 156 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1956) (Holy Trinity
School and Holy Trinity Convent); In re Jolson's Estate, 114 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Surr. Ct.
N.Y. County 1952) (College of the City of N.Y.).
56 N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 47-e (1958).
57 N.Y. Relig. Corp. Law § 48 (1958) (devise or bequest to unincorporated affiliate
under the jurisdiction of the Protestant Episcopal Church to be held by the diocesan
corporation).
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